Damian Ratka and Łukasz Wyszyński talk to Tadeusz Wróbel and Krzysztof Wilewski about the priorities for the modernization of the Polish Army and the need to strengthen the domestic defense industry.

Investments in defense after 1989 were very limited, which was influenced by both Poland’s economic situation and the long-standing belief, also in other European countries, that there was no threat of an open armed conflict in our region. This belief collapsed together with Russia’s large-scale aggression against Ukraine. In response to the increasing threat, Poland has accelerated the technical modernization of its armed forces. What were the priorities?

Damian Ratka: Since the political transformation in Poland, we have neglected the defense industry, which has in turn led to the accumulation of unresolved modernization problems. For almost three decades, only a few large purchase programs have been launched, including the procurement of the F-16 aircraft and wheeled armored personnel carriers. Therefore, when the war broke out in the east in 2022, almost everything became a priority in the context of technical modernization.

The greatest amount of work to be done, however, was in the Polish Land Forces, as the largest branch of the army. What are their most important equipment needs?

Damian Ratka: Obviously, the lack of modern infantry fighting vehicles is the most noticeable, so the priority now is to replace the BWP-1s with Borsuk IFVs, and in the long run to introduce heavier vehicles into service.

As a reminder – the fact that something needs to be done with the BWP-1 was already discussed as long ago as in the 1990s.

Damian Ratka: I believe a mistake was made somewhere in the process of making modernization plans. Huta Stalowa Wola, along with the American Delco company, proposed to modernize the BWP-1 by replacing its turret system. The army was offered a then modern turret, also mounted on the British Warrior IFVs bought by Kuwait, or on the LAV-25 wheeled vehicles owned by the US Marines. What’s important, after this modernization the BWP-1 would still be able to float and transport an assault landing crew of eight. It wasn’t done, as the offered turret was manned, and someone insisted on an unmanned one. The situation was absolutely overcomplicated at the time, because the cost of such modernization turned out to be very high compared to the obtained results, and the program fell through.

Obviously, the BWP-1 has outdated, inefficient armament, but our soldiers like its small size, which makes it easy to hide and ensures high mobility.

Damian Ratka: That’s right, its off-road capability is very good, but its size is a problem today, because the BWP-1 was not designed to transport soldiers with the equipment they currently use, such as bulletproof vests. It lacks space for equipment. Another problem is the door to the landing compartment, instead of a ramp. These are the reasons why today the priority is the Borsuk IFV.

We have a gap in the IFVs, but by buying the American M1A1 and M1A2 Abrams, as well as the South Korean K2, we solved the problem of modernizing the tank park. We want to have a licensed production of the Korean tank in Poland. However, there was an accusation of multiplying tank types in the army, which complicates logistics and training. Was it reasonable to break up the orders?

Damian Ratka: The plan was to reduce the number of tank types to two, i.e. only Abrams and K2. It is obvious that the Warsaw Pact designs will disappear soon, most of the T-72s and some PT-91s have already been transferred to Ukraine, where the remaining vehicles of these types will also go in the future. The plan was to keep Leopard 2 tanks in the heavy units until the number of K2s is increased.

Nevertheless, maintaining two types of tanks is criticized due to costs of training and logistics. The critics point to Western European NATO members who own tanks of only one type. I’m not sure if this is a good example, as they are the countries that have led to the unification of armored equipment by means of drastic reductions. As a result, they have kept the line of 150-300 tanks only of the latest type.

Damian Ratka: In Poland, the decision to have two types of tanks results from the unwritten doctrine of their use. Our military decision-makers decided that we need heavy and medium tanks, although a formal classification of this kind does not exist today, and both Abrams and K2 are MBTs. Personally, I think we should buy more Abrams tanks. This heavier type of tank with greater survivability, but requiring more logistics support, should equip two divisions conventionally called armored divisions, whereas K2 tanks should go to the mechanized divisions.

In the case of the K2 order, the key assumption was to start production in Poland. Should we continue this program?

Damian Ratka: I think that since we have already decided on the K2 tank, we should continue this program, because interrupting it and starting all over again means delaying the modernization. Unless we go to the Americans again and purchase more Abrams – the USA is resuming the production of these tanks, so their availability will increase.

What about Leopard 2 tanks, some of which are being upgraded? It costs billions.

Damian Ratka: The Leopard 2A4s had to be modernized, not only because they are outdated, but also because there was an additional issue regarding limited availability of spare parts. In the long run, when there are more and more new tanks, they will be withdrawn from active operation and will probably be moved to the reserves or even sold. Nevertheless, the Leopards will remain in the Polish Land Forces for at least another decade, or even longer, so their modernization is justified.

It seems that our artillery gained on the slowdown of the IFV modernization program. A decision was made to introduce in the Polish Armed Forces a NATO-standard, 155-mm self-propelled howitzer. On the basis of foreign licenses, the Krab was developed and entered production. Considering the above, was it justified to purchase a very similar K9 self-propelled howitzer from the Republic of Korea?

Damian Ratka: Perhaps the planned purchase of over 600 K9 howitzers was too large. Still, the previous orders for the Krabs were too small for Huta Stalowa Wola to increase its production capacity. Therefore, it wouldn’t be able to quickly increase deliveries to fill the gaps in the arsenal after the weapon transfers to Ukraine. Another issue is the potential cooperation with South Korea, because the K9 and Krab are very similar machines, they use different variants of the same chassis. Perhaps we need to think about developing a new turret system together.

There was no controversy over the procurement of missile launchers in both the US and South Korea. The acquired HIMARS and K239 Chunmoo systems are similar, but not the same.

Damian Ratka: The South Korean launcher is based on the American project. As far as I know, the mechanical interface for transport and discharge containers is the same as in the original. The only problem is software. However, the interests of the manufacturers of both systems make it difficult to reach an agreement on its compatibility. Both launchers have their advantages. The K239s are an equivalent of the tracked M270 MLRS and can carry more shells than HIMARS, which is in turn more mobile. Americans are also developing new PrSM missiles with a much longer range, up to 1,000 km, or perhaps even longer. If we bought them, it would be an added value for missile artillery troops.

Apart from heavy armament, an important area of the modernization of our army forces is a soldiers’ personal equipment. New helmets and bullet-proof vests have been being purchased for years, based on the experiences gained in foreign missions, particularly in Afghanistan and Iraq, where we had to carry out combat operations. However, these purchases were limited and only selected units received the equipment. What new elements should be introduced as soon as possible?

Damian Ratka: The needs concerning new personal equipment are not limited to helmets, vests and uniforms. For instance, we really need sights, and I am not talking about some advanced electro-optics, but a really good optical sight, which is indispensable when it comes to accurate concentration of fire. It also enables soldiers to identify targets.

Until now, the focus has been put on the so-called general military personal protective equipment. But there is a shortage of specialist models for vehicle crews. What should their personal protection look like?

Damian Ratka: When it comes to the protection of fighting vehicle crews, we need to have the same approach as other modern armies, such as the American or the Israeli army, where every crew member has a headset with a ballistic helmet, not a soft one. We need a vest in a variant tailored to the needs of a fighting vehicle crew, and it can’t just be soft ballistics – hard plates are necessary to protect the sensitive body parts from shrapnel that can enter a vehicle in the event of armor penetration. The crew may also be forced to evacuate, in which case they need personal protection.

Our tank crews have received new suits made of flame-retardant material, but in olive green color, which distinguishes them from other soldiers. Thus, after leaving the vehicle, they can automatically become a target. Many other armies use camouflage suits. Shouldn’t we follow their example?

Damian Ratka: Perhaps printing the same camouflage on the used material as on the uniforms would have caused a steep rise in the price and that’s why this option wasn’t chosen. If that was not the case, the soldiers themselves must decide if they need suits with camouflage. Concluding the subject of personal protection for crews, they also need flame-retardant balaclavas, gloves and goggles that protect the eyes, both outside and inside, from dust raised from the ground while driving. As for all soldiers, it is important to protect their hearing, because it can be damaged even by firing a regular automatic rifle. That’s why the US Army is gradually moving towards equipping all weapons with a silencer, and maybe we should also start thinking about this solution.

Let’s move on to the Navy, which was our pride when we joined NATO, as it was the first to start cooperation with the new allies. What is its role today?

Łukasz Wyszyński: The Polish Navy is a part of the Polish Armed Forces and a tool of shaping state policy. In the past, the organization of its main bases, equipping it with vessels or the doctrine of its use was influenced by Poland’s participation in the Warsaw Pact, which conducted most of its activities on land rather than sea. Now, we are a part of the North Atlantic Alliance, the largest organization of maritime states, which earn their prosperity, gross domestic product or international position mainly through the control and stabilization of maritime areas. This group includes the USA, Great Britain, France, Spain, Italy and many other states.

Meanwhile Poland is a land state with access to the sea.

Łukasz Wyszyński: Yes, but never before in the history of Poland has our economy or our gross domestic product been so dependent on the sea export and import of goods, passing through Polish and European ports.

After Finland and Sweden joined NATO, some said that the Baltic Sea had become an internal sea of the Alliance and that costly investments in the Polish Navy are unnecessary. Have military threats truly disappeared in this domain?

Łukasz Wyszyński: Based on an analysis of published strategic documents of the Russian Federation, I see that it had changed the classification of the military significance of the Baltic Sea to a lower level, but by no means wants to leave it exclusively to NATO. In the economic, military and political sense, Russia needs the Baltic Sea. What has changed are the conditions and the possibilities of its influence in the region. Most likely, we will be dealing with attempts to destabilize the political situation, activities below the threshold of war, threats to critical infrastructure and maritime transport. The Baltic Sea is one of the most intensively used communication routes in this part of the world, which gives Russians a very big window of opportunity to negatively influence the Western states, thereby increasing their expenses on ensuring security. That is why the main role of the Polish Navy is to be prepared to operate on the Baltic Sea, as it is our area of responsibility considering the Polish interests, obligations towards the allies and international law. In this area, the Navy must ensure security at sea and in the region as such, cooperating with other types of armed forces and services of the Republic of Poland. We must also be ready and have adequate capabilities to cooperate with allied forces in the Baltic Sea region and, more broadly, on waters other than the Baltic Sea, which are important to the security, development and international position of Poland and our allies.

In what way does Poland’s membership in not only NATO, but also the EU, affect the tasks of the Polish Navy?

Łukasz Wyszyński: The area of our strategic interest, and thus our activity, has certainly expanded. In the past, we concentrated mainly on the Baltic waters, and now, together with the allies, we have to be capable of stabilizing the situation in the Mediterranean, the North Atlantic, the Horn of Africa or around the North Pole, among other places. It is possible that our ships, within broader NATO crews or other allied configurations, will have to be present in those parts of the world, which are responsible for energy and trade security of not only Poland, but also the entire European Union. In order to be able to execute such tasks, we need appropriate capabilities, provided by advanced ships, aviation and logistics support. What I have in mind are, for instance, frigates ordered in the Miecznik program, to some extent mine countermeasures vessels in the Kormoran II program, as well as necessary logistics, rescue and submarine vessels.

When initial requirements for Miecznik were being determined, there was a heated discussion whether it was to be only an anti-aircraft frigate or whether it should also be armed with missile systems for striking targets on land.

Łukasz Wyszyński: Frigates are universal vessels. In the case of many navies, mainly those that don’t have destroyers, they are so-called workhorses. Their displacement, and, consequently, their hull capacity, allows them to carry many sensors and effectors, which, depending on the configuration, give them desired capabilities. As a rule, frigates, also the ones in the Miecznik program, should have systems for monitoring the airspace and protecting a ship or a team of ships against air strikes by aircraft and cruise or ballistic missiles. In this sense, it is a mobile anti-aircraft system providing protection from the sea not only to the naval forces but also land infrastructure. Moreover, such vessels, particularly in the Baltic Sea and in the area of activity of the naval forces of NATO states, have to be capable of detecting and potentially destroying submarines. Anti-submarine warfare (ASW) capabilities are strengthened through cooperation with, for example, naval aviation and submarines. Other capabilities that the Wicher, as well as the subsequent frigates in the Miecznik program, should have, is the ability to destroy enemy surface vessels, in addition to being equipped with universal artillery armament and a wide range of sensors for airspace, sea surface and underwater surveillance. Today’s ships are modular in character. To some extent, they can be specified within one series of ordered vessels. More importantly, this also allows for later upgrades that can make the frigate even more suited to the requirements of the future battlefield and tasks conducted during peace time. Let me stress again that frigates are universal vessels, which makes them very useful tools for the naval forces and, more broadly, to the entire armed forces. The fact they are equipped in universal launchers, paired with their aptitude for modifications, opens the way to develop required capabilities in a greater than current extent.

You have mentioned the capability to destroy submarines. Why is there such a need?

Łukasz Wyszyński: The Russian Navy cannot compare to NATO naval forces when it comes to surface forces and aviation, but Russia has always had a strong submarine fleet, which, apart from the strategic aspect of being able to carry nuclear weapons, was also intended to, among other things, destroy NATO aircraft carrier teams and disrupt shipping supplies. Even after the collapse of the Soviet Union, submarine construction programs continued. That is why not only our frigates ought to be prepared to destroy submarines, but we should also have our own submarines capable of executing such tasks.

What immediately comes to mind is the Orka program, which seems to have got stuck. Why is the decision to procure submarines being postponed? Is it because they must be purchased abroad, which makes the costs of the program high?

Łukasz Wyszyński: It might be one of the reasons. It is common knowledge that we don’t have the capabilities to build them on our own. The costs of procuring the vessels, training the crews and the following long-term use of the submarines are indeed very high. However, all purchases made for the benefit of the Polish Navy are spectacular, and each time very costly. Such is the case everywhere in the world. This financial pressure means that signing a contract for the Polish Navy always involves numerous calculations. That’s why decisions on the modernization of land or air forces are made faster. In some aspects, they can be executed in parts. There is also a certain lack of understanding as to the role of a submarine as an element of today’s naval forces and the Polish Armed Forces across the entire northern region. It is used not only during wartime. It operates in the sea mainly during times of peace or crisis, conducting reconnaissance of areas crucial to us and our allies. Moreover, the very fact of owning submarines and being able to use them forces any adversary to take it into account and make thorough calculations before taking any actions. Submarines execute key missions before any actions crossing the open conflict threshold occur. We can even say that their activity serves as a deterrent, particularly if they are additionally an element of the system enabling land strikes deep into the territory of a potential aggressor.

Frigates or submarines require support vessels which can be built in Poland. This has been confirmed by the deliveries of new tugboats. What type of vessels do we need the most?

Łukasz Wyszyński: The list is rather long. Apart from the radio-electronic reconnaissance vessels that are already under construction, we will need a ship providing logistics support during naval operations, which will also be used for transporting troops, coordinating the naval activities and providing support during humanitarian missions, for instance. We also need to purchase hydrographic ships, a tanker, a rescue ship and a demagnetization station. The Polish maritime industry can handle the delivery of these vessels. If need be, some technology can be obtained from partners or developed through international cooperation. In the longer run, a new training ship would also be useful. We also need to keep in mind that the Polish Navy is not only ships. We are developing coastal surface-to-surface missile systems. We need to develop our aviation. Two Saab 340 AEW&C early warning aircraft and four new AW101 helicopters spark optimism, but the needs are more extensive. In order to obtain required capabilities and implement them effectively, we must think about target reconnaissance aircraft, a larger number of helicopters and reconnaissance and ASW aircraft, rescue helicopters and those operating from ships. We can’t forget about modernization, but also the development of the logistics support for the Polish Navy, which is important not only during a threat of conflict, but also in times of peace and in our cooperation with allies.

Numerous modernization programs are also being executed in the Polish Air Force. We are waiting for the first multirole F-35 aircraft and more FA-50 light combat aircraft. Since we will not be able to produce combat aircraft on our own in the foreseeable future, shouldn’t we join some multinational program? Even countries richer than Poland are combining forces, as a development of the next generation of combat aircraft requires spending gigantic sums of money.

Damian Ratka: I would pay careful attention to the way such a multinational program is organized, since I have noticed one regularity – European joint venture programs have either ended as spectacular flops, or one or several countries would leave the project and go their separate way. A good example is the Eurofighter combat aircraft project, initially involving the French, who later left it and developed their own Rafale, which sells better than Eurofighter. We also have joint venture programs with a leading state, which has a decisive influence on the project, while others just contribute financially. One such program is the F-35.

Łukasz Wyszyński: There are a lot of challenges. We are talking about the entire process of introducing the F-35 into the Polish Air Force, and further in the Polish Armed Forces, increasing the number of available platforms, and in a long run, probably next generation aircraft. The modernization and development of logistics support, crucial for the operation of the mentioned types of aircraft, is also of essence. We need flying tankers, which would entirely change the capabilities of our combat machines. Air reconnaissance aircraft linked to command centers are also important. All these increasingly advanced platforms are extremely valuable, as they provide advantage over technologically less-advanced armies, which do not have potential to multiply capabilities across domains. Another important issue is to what extent the systems we procure, often from different directions, are inter-operational – for example, whether the purchased armament can be integrated with various types of machines.

In the accelerated modernization of the Polish Armed Forces, we have chosen the USA and the Republic of Korea as our strategic partners. This choice has stirred criticism in some European countries. Is the accusation that we have turned our backs on Europe justified?

Damian Ratka: Obviously, politics influences the choice of partners, but in our situation the key element was that the Americans and Koreans offered faster delivery times for contracted armament. The European defense industry, whose production capacity was drastically reduced by political decisions after the Cold War, did not have such opportunities. France, whose defense industry is heavily oriented on export, especially to non-European markets, is the only European state that has maintained a somewhat greater capacity in producing certain categories of armaments.

Americans and Koreans had another advantage that enabled speedy fulfillment of orders – they could offer transfer of ready equipment from their warehouses, while in Europe the reserves of equipment, ammunition and supplies that could possibly be brought back into service in case of need have been reduced to virtually nothing. This problem became apparent on the occasion of organizing military support for Ukraine, when it turned out that even older types of armament were not available. Ukraine survived largely because it had its own stock of post-Soviet weapons. Russia also has its own supply of such armament. Of course, we can make jokes about sending T-55s to the front, but an old tank is better than no tank at all. That’s why the Americans are keeping their strategic reserves intact. Europe should also rebuild its reserves. Poland first needs to focus on providing new equipment to military units. However, we must start thinking about further purchases in order to create reserves and stockpiles. It is a strategic necessity, because when a war breaks out, domestic production is impossible. That’s why it’s crucial to have strategic partners who can provide supplies of equipment that our soldiers are familiar with, that they can operate and repair.

It is a known fact that technical modernization of the Armed Forces is a never-ending process. Currently, the focus is on introducing combat-proven weapon systems into the army, but what direction should we take when preparing long-term plans for the development of the Armed Forces? Investments in network-centricity, unmanned systems operating in different domains, and more extensive use of artificial intelligence seem indisputable. What else should we consider in order to maintain a high level of modernity in our Armed Forces, and what might be the impact of the developments in the global security situation in this regard?

Łukasz Wyszyński: The mentioned areas are definitely important. They are to ensure our advantage on the network-centric and multi-domain battlefield. Considering the challenges of the future, I would nevertheless emphasize the significance of people. There are two types of challenges that I notice in this area. The first is social changes taking place in particular countries, which depend on, among other things, cultural models, access to information and educational system. Thus, we have to think about a system of education that allows for building a society aware of global conditions and able to assert Polish interests in the international system, but also capable of wisely and critically navigating the information space, which has become a new domain of combat. Only then can we be certain it is a society prepared to deal with the problems of the future, ready to take collective action in the face of danger. Another challenge is the training, command and support systems in the Polish Armed Forces. Proper training, as well as right attitudes and creativity of people who serve at various levels of command shape our determination to take action and our efficiency in the face of future threats. Therefore, we must constantly improve and develop the system of training increasing the competencies of soldiers.

Damian Ratka: In a long run, we should invest in power units for vehicles – first in cooperation with others, and then, if possible, on our own. Investments in combat vehicles themselves are also very important, because in some time we should have Polish MBTs, IFVs, APCs, and specialized vehicles based on them. All over the world, strategically important countries are spending a lot of money on the development of armored weapons, hybrid drives, armor, active defense and armament systems. That’s exactly what we should be investing in – the development of armament, both for infantry and vehicles. Such investments should also include the development of ammunition and the capability to produce it.

Damian Ratka is a Senior Editor at Defence24, specializing in armored weapons, developed mainly in the USA, the UK, the former USSR (Ukraine, Russian Federation) and Israel.

Łukasz Wyszyński, PhD, is Head of the Institute of International Relations at the Polish Naval Academy and Deputy Head of the Doctoral School at the Federation of Military Academies. He is the Board Member of the Shipbuilding Council (Rada Budowy Okrętów) and the Editor of the YouTube channel Stosunki Międzynarodowe AMW (Polish Naval Academy International Relations). His research interests include issues relating to changes in the international system, maritime geopolitics, and the role and use of armed forces, mainly the naval component, in foreign and national security policy.